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Abstract
Human communication and interaction had been rapidly evolving with the 
advent and continuing influence of social media (SM) thereby accelerating infor-
mation exchange and increasing global connectivity. Despite clear advantages, this 
new technology can present unintended consequences including medical misinfor-
mation and “fake news.” Although International Health Security (IHS) stands to 
benefit tremendously from various SM platforms, high-level decision-makers and 
other stakeholders must also be aware of the dangers related to its intentional and 
unintentional misuse (and abuse). An overview of SM utility in fighting disease, 
disseminating life-saving information, and organizing people and teams in a 
constructive fashion is discussed herein. The potential negatives associated with 
SM misuse, including intentional and unintentional misinformation, as well as the 
ability to organize people in a disruptive fashion, will also be presented. Our treatise 
will additionally outline how deliberate misinformation may lead to harmful behav-
iors, public health panics, and orchestrated patterns of distrust. In terms of both 
its affirmative and destructive considerations, SM can be viewed as an asymmetric 
influencing force, with observed effects (whether beneficial or harmful) being 
disproportionately greater than the cost of the intervention.
Keywords: global health security, International Health Security, social media, 
misinformation, fake news
1. Introduction
International Health Security (IHS) includes a broad range of intertwined 
subject areas are related to human security [1–4]. Introduced by the United Nations 
in the mid-1990s, the definition of “health security” is nebulous because of an 
overlap between its constituent “health” and “security” components [5]. Thus, 
there continues to be debate about the degree of such overlap and its implications. 
In addition, although traditional IHS applications focus on bio-terrorism and 
emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) [6, 7], the concepts of “health” and “security” 
can be applied more broadly when different man-made and non-man-made factors, 
from climate change to cyber health security are considered [8–11].
The domination of personal and professional human interactions by the increas-
ingly more powerful and sophisticated social media (SM) platforms brought with 
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it many benefits and challenges. For example, SM has introduced conditions for 
cyberbullying, voter/public opinion manipulation, and criminal activity despite 
its well-intended attempts to bring people together in the digital, boundaryless 
environment [12]. Here, we will discuss how SM can create both constructive and 
destructive forces, focusing specifically on IHS and related topic areas.
2. The definition of social media
SM’s definition and sphere of influence extend to “any medium involving user-
generated content” [13, 14]. Assorted subdomains within SM may include blogs or 
microblogs, interactive forums, message boards, social networks, wikis, as well as 
other types of audiovisual media-based platforms (e.g., photo or video sharing sites) 
[13–15]. Comprehensive acceptance of SM contributed to a startling rise in the over-
all amount of information being shared, the acceleration and pervasiveness of such 
sharing, as well as the ability to interact across nearly all areas of human activity, 
inclusive of public health and medical care [12, 16]. It must be noted that the vast 
volume of shared information on SM is largely unfiltered and difficult to verify.
The reach and breadth of SM platforms and related communication tools have 
developed exponentially and matured as the Internet has expanded [14, 17, 18]. 
During this time, the purpose and focus of various SM tools remained poorly 
defined [19, 20]. While altruism is at the heart of most large SM platforms, it is 
difficult to promote (or enforce) its charitable and humanitarian application by 
end-users, especially in the context of best interest of communities [21–23]. As 
with all discourses involving the interchange of knowledge, transparency becomes 
a paramount concern in that any information disclosures are made in a manner that 
is both open and honest, in effect strengthening the legitimacy of the involved SM 
platform [24–26]. It is critical that SM adheres to accepted ethical and scientific 
norms and that this adherence applies to the full range of related domains, includ-
ing bioinformatics, statistical testing, peer-review, and independent validation 
[27–34]. It should be emphasized that particularly when it pertains to SM in the 
context of the subsequent IHS arguments made in this chapter, the most popular, 
seemingly persuasive, and commonly repeated messaging does not always con-
stitute the absolute truth or reliable information, and that one should be free to 
question and challenge any data he/she is presented with [35–40]. This is especially 
applicable in the setting of question-and-answer format of information exchange, 
where both relevance and quality of information are critical [40].
3.  Social media platforms: “weaponizing” human emotions and 
interactions
The very presence of today’s Internet has created the expectation of internation-
alization and universal information sharing amid the rapidly evolving frameworks 
of technological and social change [41–43]. As the Internet matured, the type and 
presentation of the information itself evolved, with increasing participation of highly 
diversified, user-furnished content [44]. Human beings have always valued the 
stimuli provided by their senses, either consciously or subconsciously. People tend 
to create various reference points, both to self and others, allowing the construction 
of an environment that psychologically conditions its participants. This may lead to 
a compulsive feedback loop that emerges from intense competitive pressures, with 
users trying to out-compete themselves and others in search of external affirmation 
[45–49]. As part of its continued development, the Internet became rich in various 
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audio-visual representations specifically designed to show appreciation or deprecia-
tion of the stimuli [49–51]. From a historical perspective, the first “like” button has 
been attributed to Vimeo, a video sharing platform that appeared in 2005 [52, 53]. 
Vimeo designers were inspired by Diggs, a Website that encouraged the clicking of a 
button labeled “digg” when a rewarding picture was observed by an end-user or an 
interesting article was read. Similar concepts have been fully embraced across the SM 
sphere and serve as the “fuel” in the highly gamified “ratings” competition [53–56].
The concept of “liking” or providing “virtual endorsement” to an information 
snippet on an SM platform has sparked intense research into the implications and 
consequences of such an action that, on initial blush, appears benign [57–59]. More 
specifically, there is evidence that an action of providing a “like” creates a basis 
for a “directed voting” or reward system of sorts [59, 60]. Early research by Davey 
et al. [61] investigated the effect of “being liked” on specific regions of the brain. 
Primary reward and self-related regions were activated under such conditions (e.g., 
nucleus accumbens, ventral tegmentum midbrain, ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex, and amygdala among others) [61]. Furthermore, there was a proportionately 
greater activation of the these neurological regions in response to “being liked” by 
individuals who are more highly regarded [61]. Sherman et al. [62] used a computer 
program resembling Instagram (Facebook, Inc., Menlo Park, California, USA) to 
investigate regions of the brain that exhibited significant activity when an image 
was “liked.” Their results showed statistically significant activation in the dorsal and 
ventral striatum, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, midbrain, and amygdala when 
“liking” an image versus simply pressing “next” to view the subsequent image [62]. 
The former regions were implicated in reward and the latter being implicated in 
reward processing [63, 64]. Sherman et al. [62] did note that the esthetic quality of 
the image itself can lead to activation of similar pathways. If both the “act of liking” 
and the act of “receiving a like” are being interpreted as rewards, it becomes clear as 
to why SM has been expanding so quickly. However, this also leads to the question, 
what are the consequences of such rewards?
Studies have linked these changes to dopaminergic system and its correspond-
ing communication with the striatum [65]. When looking at the effects of “like” 
from the neuroscience perspective, functional MRI studies of SM users suggest 
that the “popularity of a photo” has a significant effect on its viewer’s perception. 
A popular photo was more likely to receive more “likes” from SM peers regardless 
of the activity being portrayed [66]. Sherman et al. [65] went on to discuss the 
quantification of social endorsement as an important example of sociocultural 
learning. Moreover, the question arises as to whether individuals actively engaged 
in SM-based discourses are more likely to neglect direct human interactions in favor 
of reaching larger, “virtual and impersonal” audiences [46, 67, 68]. If so, what are 
the implications of such conditioning to the ability to critically evaluate information 
encountered on SM platforms? Likewise, how does one sort out what is real versus 
what is virtual, as well as the impact of information upon each of these domains?
Before venturing back to the primary discussion of the relationship between 
SM and IHS, the concepts of “vague-booking” and “mediated lurking” should be 
noted [66, 69]. Berryman et al. [66] define “vague-booking” as sharing “ambiguous 
but alarming posts” to attract attention. “Mediated lurking” on the other hand is 
defined as becoming a member/user of a SM platform but “wishing to go largely 
undetected” [69, 70]. Finally, one would be remiss without mentioning the poten-
tial for “cyberbullying” and “cyber aggression” [71, 72]. These phenomena can 
create a real and damaging link between online and real-life behaviors [71, 73, 74].  
Aggressive online behaviors have been categorized into subtypes, which include 
hostile aggression (e.g., “an act of aggression stemming from a feeling of anger and 
aimed at inflicting pain or injury”) and instrumental aggression (e.g., “an intention 
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to hurt the other person, but the hurting takes place as a means to some goal other 
than causing pain”) [75]. Within this general context, SM facilitates and escalates 
negative behaviors that may serve to “deliver aggression,” while not being physically 
present, yet directed toward the person of interest. Jamison et al. [76] investigated 
the types of malicious actors that are found on Twitter (Twitter, San Francisco, 
California, USA) and the potential ramifications of their influence. Three categories 
of malicious actors were identified: (1) automated accounts (i.e., bots without 
human influence once created), (2) semiautomated accounts (i.e., bots with some 
degree of human influence), and (3) malicious humans [76]. Malicious SM actors 
have been labeled “trolls,” with the associated activity of “trolling” defined as 
“posting denigrating and inflammatory messages in order to argue and/or emo-
tionally upset individuals” [77]. Each form allows for altering influence, as well as 
delivering aggression. In particular, if the actors can deliver an aggressive message 
with a disregard for any ramifications, they are in fact executing the purest form 
of passive aggression, a demonstration of hostile feelings in a non-confrontational 
manner [78, 79]. All of the above definitions, characteristics, behavioral patterns, 
and consequences play an important role in the “weaponization” of SM as it relates 
to IHS. Within this psychological context, a discussion of various aspects of concern 
regarding targeted SM content manipulation is warranted [80].
4. Social media in public health
As outlined in previous sections, SM has several emerging real-life applica-
tions in public health [81]. It is a powerful platform for real-time data collection, 
especially during fast-moving events such as epidemics or outbreaks [81, 82]. User 
inputs on SM platforms may help with the detection—and subsequent mapping—of 
geographic patterns for disease-specific signs or symptoms, confirmed cases, and/
or other relevant parameters [83]. The resultant data can then be filtered, tracked, 
collected, analyzed/modeled, and reported [84, 85].
The use of SM to analyze various aspects of disease outbreaks (e.g., prediction, 
detection, and tracking) was described in the early 2010s by several independent 
groups [86–89]. SM was felt to be instrumental in containing the Ebola outbreak in 
Nigeria through enhanced information sharing and coordination between front line 
personnel [85]. While Internet “search engines” are valued tools, primarily because 
they can be used in the leveraging of targeted marketing and sales, their use in 
characterizing the epidemiology, and geographic evolution of an emerging disease 
[90–92] as well as other more scientifically focused endeavors [93, 94] is of unques-
tionable worth. Increased frequency of specifically tracked search queries, such as 
“how does one prevent the flu,” “what is the treatment of the flu,” and “what are the 
most common symptoms of the flu” have shown accuracy and temporal correlation 
with the extent of disease spread and its prevalence, especially when contrasted 
against more traditional means of tracking outbreak progression. There is also 
a strong correlation between trends identified by “Internet search engines” and 
phenomena such as emergency department visits by patients with influenza [95]. 
A striking example of the correlation between Google™ Trends and an emerging 
infectious threat was recently demonstrated in an “infodemiological” study of the 
Wuhan coronavirus (2019-nCoV) [96]. Still, it is not surprising that some pragmatic 
researchers urge caution when using such information in the absence of complete 
epidemiological understanding, context, and expert interpretation [97, 98].
Despite some flaws, strict adherence to proper scientific methodology and 
structured peer review can provide reasonably robust ways of enforcing proper 
balance to help minimize the risk of propagation of false or misleading information 
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[99–101]. To ensure wide adoption, SM platforms tend to be open and inviting, thus 
providing an essentially unrestricted forum for the exchange of ideas. Much of this 
occurs in the name of “protecting and enabling free speech.” Consequently, short 
of legal action, objective accountability for communicated content is lacking at best 
[102–105]. In certain scenarios, unrestricted online attacks can be very destructive, 
including consequences in both in the “real” and “digital” domains, and both per-
sonally and professionally [12, 106]. Some forms of malicious SM participation have 
been discussed in an aforementioned section. Among established SM platforms, 
there seems to be a struggle to find a balance between self- or user/community-cen-
sorship and various forms of “online aggression” [12, 72, 107]. Significant spillover 
into public health can occur, especially among minors, and can have tremendous 
impact when “online actions” translate into “real-world implications” [108–111].
5. International Health Security: constructive uses of social media
It has been shown that SM-based vigilance can be useful for outbreak or epi-
demic interception, tracking, and data reporting [86, 87, 112, 113]. In the midst of 
the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, isolated islands of the disease were success-
fully contained leveraging SM-based coordination tools, including targeted identi-
fication of misinformation and its prompt correction [85]. SM can also be valuable 
to public health community when determining how human networks behave in the 
context of social determinants of health (e.g., health behaviors, resource avail-
ability, and general compliance) [114]. Thus, SM may be particularly helpful in 
promoting positive health behaviors [115]. All of the above implementations of SM 
in public health are now being actively employed during the Wuhan 2019-nCoV 
outbreak, with focus on augmented intelligence in the context of preventing the 
spread of the disease [116, 117]. An additional use case for SM, as reported in con-
junction with the 2019-nCoV, is the promotion of psychological crisis interventions 
using popular SM channels to share strategies for dealing with stress and anxiety 
associated with the outbreak [118].
6.  International Health Security: potentially harmful aspects of social 
media use
The sharing of non-peer-reviewed information over SM entails the potential 
of transmitting misinformation or misinterpretation of such unfiltered content 
[119], especially if it is out of context. The hourly volume of SM messaging that 
may contain “inaccurate or fake news” outnumbers “fact checking” capabilities by 
as much as 10-fold [120]. In addition, the average time between the release of “fake 
news” and any “fact checking” response may be greater than 12 hours, thereby 
causing significant damage before the misinformation can be rectified [120]. Thus, 
misinformation introduced into public discourse can be substantial if placed by a 
highly motivated and appropriately equipped individual (or group). In the context 
of IHS, the consequences can be profound when “fake news” is carefully crafted 
and communicated in a strategic manner (Table 1). “Fake news” can be damaging 
in several ways, from spreading false claims (e.g., that risk of vaccines is greater 
than their benefits), to misinforming the public regarding a particular health 
condition (e.g., misstating signs and symptoms of a viral infection). Programmatic 
moderation of content is one of the solutions that SM outlets have embraced, but 
this process is very resource-intensive, may be quite cumbersome, and may not 
apply universally across different types of data [121, 122]. Additionally, in regard to 
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SM and addiction, there are significant correlations between symptoms of addic-
tion to technology use and mental health conditions [123]. Furthermore, more 
advanced technological applications, such as virtual reality, have been associated 
with dissociation and lower “sense of presence” in objective reality [124]. Various 
psychological aspects and nuances associated with SM use were discussed earlier in 
the chapter, and the reader is referred there to avoid content redundancy.
Although SM can provide an excellent medium for open discourse on a broad 
range of topics, the troubling reality is that SM may foster a society with fewer 
defined boundaries (e.g., “real-life friend” versus “social media friend”) [125, 126]. 
Thereby no longer plainly demarcating a defined personal space and presenting 
a risk of intentional or unintended “invasion” [127, 128]. Although SM’s negative 
aspects have been addressed, there is little doubt that responsible use of SM facili-
tates the public awareness of various health/mental health matters and thus can 
provide an overall positive influence.
There are examples of SM as a successful tracking tool of actual disease out-
breaks/epidemics [86]. However, the risk of “false alarms” does exist, potentially 
affecting the utility of SM as a useful public health tracking tool at the population 
level [129]. The tracked data often lack specificity [130], can be misinterpreted 
and/or distorted, and subsequently promoted by influential personas without 
appropriate training or content expertise [131, 132]. Reversing damage caused by 
distortion of the facts and misinterpretation can be challenging [133–137]. For 
example, the controversy regarding the alleged association between childhood vac-
cination and autism exemplifies how concerns of global nature can be distorted in 
a highly publicized fashion [138–140]. Despite multiple research studies that were 
Harmful behavior Description Comments
Cyberbullying SM content that is of intimidating or 
threatening in character, with potential for 
risk to self or others. Associated harm may 
be both mental and physical
Robust surveillance, reporting, and 
prompt remediation; establishing 




Intentional release of erroneous news and 
information via both traditional and SM. 
Consequences can be both unintended 
and unpredictable, including intentionally 
or unintentionally harmful or damaging 
behaviors, or misdirected action
Adherence to established news 
reporting standards; Sound 
editorial policies and procedures. 
Appropriate fact-checking and 
prompt intervention to avoid any 
resultant or potential harm
Intentional 
misinformation
Leading individuals to perform actions 
that may have harmful consequences 
on self or others. Release of intentional 
misinformation may result in random and 
unpredictable downstream events. The 
process involves the end-user receiving, 
processing, and implementing any 
information before actual harm can result
Empowering SM moderators 
to remove harmful content; 
Vigilance, fact-checking, and 
timely intervention to prevent any 
potential or actual damage from 
dissemination of false information; 
legal consequences for intentional 
introduction of potentially 
damaging misinformation
Misinterpretation Erroneous conclusions made regarding 
data generated or compiled from SM 
inputs. Although usually not intentional, 
this may lead to misguided planning or 
implementations, with some potential for 
harm
Careful cross-checking and 
verification of both the source data 
and the analytical methods; use 
of established decision-making 




Primary modes of deleterious behavioral patterns described on social media, with associated characteristics, 
potential for negative consequences, and proposed remedial/corrective measures.
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unable to definitively prove a connection between childhood vaccines and autism, 
large groups within the society still advocate otherwise [141–143]. Unfortunately, 
misplaced trust tends to be given to the messengers and various SM tools, rather 
than the authorities and the medical community [144–146]. These considerations 
need to be taken from the perspective of IHS, especially when one realizes that 
the “most prominent voice” is not universally the one with the correct or the best 
answer [147, 148].
There is a clear and present danger of malignant actors abusing SM to spread 
disinformation that may potentially lead to third-party harm [149, 150]. In 2009, 
in the midst of the swine influenza season, there was a substantial uptick in SM 
reporting of various conspiracies about the flu virus, its alleged genetically engi-
neered origins, and other unfounded rumors [151–153]. Thousands of user views 
of the questionable material were recorded by involved SM platforms, which was 
likely a significant underestimate [151–153], with literally thousands of other search 
results on the “swine flu epidemic” topic [154]. Similar sources of misinformation 
continue to be abundant despite their unfounded assumptions and obvious danger 
[155, 156]. For example, SM outlets are rich with unfounded speculation regarding 
the most recent coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China [157, 158]. Vijaykumar et al. 
[159] describe the so-called “social media virality risk,” which attempts to quantify 
the amplification of the population’s perception of public health risk in the overall 
context of “social media effectiveness.” Their conceptual model is called Risk 
Amplification through Media Spread (RAMS) [159].
Of critical importance, SM platforms may be preferred by individuals (or 
groups) who perceive the lack of other means to express their beliefs and thoughts. 
As such, SM can be thought of as “virtual aggregators” for people who share gener-
ally compatible and/or synergistic viewpoints [160–162]. Moreover, there is a non-
trivial risk of evolution of such “virtual groups” beyond “online presence” [163]. 
Traditionally, unconventional or controversial beliefs tended to be often marginal-
ized by the society, with relative lack of effective platforms to share thoughts and 
ideas [164–166]. In current times, essentially every idea can have an “online home” 
with SM actively facilitating the aggregation of like-minded people into groups 
[167, 168]. And although “virtual homes” can become hubs for creativity, innova-
tive thinking, scientific discovery, understanding, diversity, and idea exploration, 
they can also be the sources of damaging misinformation. Finally, there is at least 
some evidence that SM may also create an avenue for people to explore different 
points of view, thus potentially providing an avenue for “new perspectives and open 
mindedness” [159, 169]. Table 2 shows an overview of characteristics likely to be 
correlated with misinformation, with a focus on SM-related aspects.
Equipped with SM tools, “malignant actors” can develop a substantial potential 
for harm and otherwise destructive consequences. Thus, the malignant use of 
SM poses a risk to IHS. Beyond this, unimpeded access to Internet infrastructure, 
when “passively” permitted by countries/governments, can create conditions for 
the “malignant actor” or “fictitious public discourse” to lead to societal disruption 
and harm, involving both institutions and individuals [170, 171]. The subsequent 
sections will discuss malignant use cases where SM manipulation is centralized 
(e.g., government) versus decentralized (individuals, special interests, and non-
governmental groups).
When centralized control of Internet infrastructure (e.g., government) is pres-
ent, a narrative can in theory be created at the top echelons of power, and wide 
dissemination of messaging can be reasonably easily achieved. Under well-intended 
circumstances, this capability should be used to facilitate education and positive 
health behaviors. Having said that, if a central authority is the “bad actor” and their 
messaging is used to “manipulate” public discussions, the message may constitute an 
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attempt to influence various policy objectives, such as a particular therapy, vaccine, 
or preventive health measure (s) [172, 173]. Corrupt central authorities may also 
manipulate SM messaging for monetary gain and/or political goals [174–176]. In this 
context, focused SM messages may involve falsified statements, manipulated statis-
tics, and edited images. Such messaging can be directed at a particular target, includ-
ing religious, ethnic, racial, political, and gender-specific or other groups [177–179].
When central control is not present, but laws and/or executive orders render SM 
fully unrestricted to all potential actors, then the so-called peripheral control can be 
attained [180–182]. Under such circumstances, individuals or interests can freely 
target selected individuals, groups, and organizations for manipulation via dis-
semination of false information via SM [183–186]. In the arena of peripheral control, 
third-party entities (e.g., interest groups) who wish to influence a particular policy 
Factor Comment
Anonymous authorship Although some press/news releases may not give credit to specific author(s) 
or source(s), stories/information from anonymous sources (especially if 
impossible to independently verify) should prompt additional confirmation; 
this is especially true when making policies or implementing procedures based 
on such information
Attractive or “catchy” 
headline
A “catchy” headline tends to attract a larger number of viewers and may help 
enhance subsequent dissemination of (mis)information
Cult-like followership Concepts that attract cult-like (often fanatical) followership tend to be more 
prone to aggregate “SM communities” around them. This, in turn, may assist 
in further propagation of biased/false information
Disclaimer regarding the 
information is provided 
alongside the content
In most cases, sources that feature a disclaimer should be considered with 
caution, mainly because disclaimers tend to be used in the setting of potential 
liability risk
Dramatic or otherwise 
emotional nature of the 
content
If the content contains dramatic or emotional language, and/or leads to a 
strong emotional response, it was most likely intended to do so. Oftentimes, 
hidden agenda(s) may be present
Forward-looking claims 
or predictive statements 
may be embedded
News content that provides specific claim of a future event is most likely 
unauthentic. Likewise, when faced with reports of an effective therapy, end-
users should carefully seek verification and remain skeptical
Information superficially 
“appears” to be legitimate
When “crafted and disseminated” in a specific and deliberate fashion, wrong 
information may appear legitimate. Only after a more careful/detailed review, 
factual or logical inconsistencies may be found
Reputable source/origin 
of the information is 
claimed by authors
FN may gain more credibility if the source “appears” legitimate. Having 
said that, any significant claims from an apparently respected source must 
be substantiated and verified, especially if the story’s author is not clearly 
identifiable (see above under “anonymous authorship”)
Propagation by high-
profile individuals
Superficial appearance of credibility can often be maintained around fictional 
story accounts, especially when reputable individuals (e.g., community 
leaders, politicians, scientists) participate in information dissemination
The story is too good to 
be true…
In cases where SM information appears to be “too good to be true,” the end-
users should remain critical and question any such reports/stories
Unusual or atypical 
domain name/uniform 
resource locator (URL)
When content is located on a Website, or originates from a source with an 
unusual domain name, suspicious user identification, and/or URL, skepticism 
is always wise
FN, fake news; SM, social media; URL, uniform resource locator.
Table 2. 
Factors that may signal that one is exposed to attempts at the dissemination of “fake news” and misinformation 
on social media platforms.
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are able to use SM disguised as indigenous individuals or organizations, modulating 
the discourse to their benefit [187]. Inherent to modern capitalist societies is that 
major SM platforms are for-profit entities and thus can be maneuvered using finan-
cial resources to influence a society from the periphery [130, 188]. Finally, there is 
a less likely possibility that the more dominant SM platforms may evolve into new 
“central authorities” over time.
From public health standpoint, the potential for harm is both real and sig-
nificant. Hypothetically, a broad range of harmful actions may be initiated using 
misguided SM, including the manipulation of populations to report to wrong/inap-
propriate locations for assistance [189, 190], misdirecting local populations with 
regard to the evacuation routes, sanctuaries/safe places, as well as creating public 
distress that leads to waste or misuse of precious public health resources [191–193]. 
Of importance, healthcare workers could theoretically be manipulated through 
SM platforms against accepting the risks associated with care for those in need, 
thus effectively negating a provider’s professional obligations [194, 195]. Although 
various conspiracy theories have been propagated throughout the history, their dis-
semination has escalated in the era of multiple SM platforms [196, 197]. As a result, 
the risk exists of an “engineered reality” by individuals or entities, using SM as the 
ultimate “mind bending” tool [198]. The theme of SM contributing to fear and 
misinformation or disinformation in the IHS context continues into the 2020s, with 
similar concerns being noted around the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak [199].
Finally, ongoing high-level efforts are underway to reduce the harm from 
SM-based disinformation at the national and international levels. More specifi-
cally, there is an increasing number of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations that actively focus on this important health security problem. 
This growing list includes the National Cyber Directorate in Israel, the National 
Security Communications Team (NSCT) in the United Kingdom, the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) and the Department of Home Affairs 
in Australia, the Security Intelligence Service and the Defense Intelligence Service 
in Denmark, and the National Security Agency in France, among many others. In 
addition, major SM providers are signatories to the European Union (EU) Code 
of Practice on Disinformation. However, the same providers are not bound by this 
Code of Practice outside of the geographic boundaries of the Union [200].
7. Conclusions
Continuous worldwide information sharing fosters innovation and knowledge 
creation, thus facilitating humanity’s ongoing progress. The same is true regard-
ing the implementation of SM tools in the area of public health/health security. 
Although there are undoubtedly important benefits of SM in this realm, the 
in-depth understanding of modern SM platforms is still somewhat limited. The 
introduction of SM into the domain of public health presented the community with 
a unique opportunity for the development of highly efficient, integrated tools for 
disease tracking and epidemiologic trend identification. At the same time, users 
must remain cautious because the potential for both intentional and unintentional 
misuse of data may be present, resulting in substantial and often unpredictable 
harm. Finally, malignant actors in control of the SM narrative can cause deliberate 
harm through the intentional propagation of “fake news” and misinformation. 
Consequently, risks and benefits associated with the use of SM in the realm of pub-
lic health/IHS must be carefully considered to minimize any negative downstream 
consequences.
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